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Inequality of Opportunity in Health Care in China: 
Suggestion on the Construction of the Urban-Rural Integrated 
Medical Insurance System 
 
( Version I ) 
 
Abstract: This paper investigates the urban-rural inequality of opportunity in health 
care in China based on the theory of equality of opportunity of Roemer (1998). 
Following the compensation principle proposed by Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2011), 
this paper establishes a decomposition strategy of the fairness gap, which we use for 
the measurement of the inequality of opportunity in the urban-rural health care use. 
Empirical analysis using the CHNS data shows that the ratios of the fairness gap to 
the directly observed average urban-rural difference in health care are 1.167 during 
1997-2000 and 1.744 during 2004-2006, indicating that the average urban-rural 
difference observed directly from original statistical data may underestimate the 
degree of the essential inequity. Meanwhile, the increasing fairness gap and the 
decomposition results imply that generally leveling the urban-rural reimbursement 
ratios is probably not sufficient, and pro-disadvantage policies should be put in place 
in order to mitigate or even eliminate the inequality of opportunity in health care use 
between urban and rural residents. The results are also illuminating for the 
experiments and establishment of the urban-rural integrated medical insurance system 
(URIMIS) in China. The pro-disadvantage policies will be more appreciated and 
effective in the promotion of the equality of opportunity in health care, within the 
background of urban-rural dualistic social structure and widening urban-rural income 
gap. This suggestion is supported by data from the URIMIS pilot regions in Jiangsu 
province. The results show that the fairness gap can be narrowed significantly via 
pro-disadvantage policies. 
Key words: equality of opportunity; health care; fairness gap; urban-rural integrated 
medical insurance system 
 
JEL Classification: D12, D63, I18 
 
Abbreviations: in this paper, we have used some abbreviations for convenience. Among these abbreviations, some 
are standard and commonly used; while some are not, such as URIMIS (urban-rural integrated medical insurance 
system), which refers to a newly developed medical insurance system at the service of both urban and rural 
residents. 
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1. Introduction 
There have long been large urban-rural disparities in health and health care in 
China due to the deficiency of rural medical insurance system and other urban-rural 
dualistic systems. These disparities have unfortunately not been reduced effectively in 
the early stage of health care reform. Although the New Cooperative Medical Scheme 
(NCMS)－specially established for rural residents－has almost realized a complete 
coverage, its insurance level is too low to decrease the out-of-pocket health care 
expenditure. Therefore the current NCMS seems of little help to effectively protect 
the insureds from the catastrophic health expenditure or poverty caused by diseases 
(Wagstaff et al., 2009; Lei and Lin, 2009; Yip and Hsiao, 2009). Such situation will 
inevitably impede the human capital development in rural areas, being useless for the 
elimination of the poverty trap and relative deprivation, as well as for the equalization 
of public services. 
There is an urgent need to build an urban-rural integrated medical insurance 
system (for short, the URIMIS), which is aiming at promoting the urban-rural 
balanced development in health and health care. Although pilot experiments have 
sprung up in recent years, the most widely used policy merely focuses on the 
reimbursement-ratio increasement, especially for rural residents, in order to reach a 
uniform medical insurance policy between the urban and the rural. However, it is not 
enough to level the reimbursement ratios for both urban and rural residents to cope 
with the urban-rural disparities in health and health care. Meanwhile, it will also be 
misleading if the integrated policy expects to see a similar health care expenditure 
between urban and rural residents. The pursuit of outcome equality (such as the same 
health care expenditure) and the reimbursement equality (such as the same 
reimbursement ratio) may result in no efficiency, even no equity, since there are 
intrinsic differences between urban and rural residents due to their individual or 
circumstance characteristics1. Thus we should pay more attention on the realization of 
the equality of opportunity (EOp)－an expression of the essential equality in this 
paper－in health and health care. This viewpoint is also of great importance during 
the policy making of the URIMIS. Unfortunately, there have been few discussions and 
researches on the EOp in the health domain in China. Therefore, this paper intends to 
evaluate the urban-rural essential inequality in health care based on the theory of the 
EOp of Roemer (1993, 1998, 2002), and then gives our suggestion on the 
improvement of the URIMIS policies. 
                                                        
1 We do not intend to dig into this issue, but we’ve given several examples in Appendix A as a simple explanation. 
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It is convinced that the EOp is of vital importance for both academic researches 
and policy making (World Bank, 2005). However, the development of the EOp in the 
field of health and health care is still in its infancy, not to mention relevant researches 
about China. This paper just tries to use this theory to re-examine the urban-rural 
disparities in health care in China. What’s more, the development of the URIMIS is 
one of the major topics in China in recent years. Although the construction policies 
are explored among pilot regions, there have been no unified standards for the 
evaluation and comparison yet. Therefore we also hope that this paper can offer some 
practical suggestions on the URIMIS construction and the improvement of health care 
fairness in China. 
Based on the theory of the EOp developed by Roemer (1993, 1998, 2002), and 
the compensation principle for the EOp analysis proposed by Fleurbaey and 
Schokkaert (2009, 2011), this paper calculates and decomposes the urban-rural 
fairness gaps in health care in China. By using data from the China Health and 
Nutrition Survey (CHNS), the results show that: (1) during the two periods of 1997－
2000 and 2004－2006, the ratios of the fairness gap to the directly observed average 
urban-rural difference in health care, when we take urban circumstances as the “ideal” 
reference circumstances, are 1.167 and 1.744 respectively, indicating that an 
underestimation would be made if we simply take urban-rural difference, which can 
be directly observed from the original statistical data, as inequality; (2) the 
significance of the effect of reimbursement ratio decreases in the fairness gap 
producing and widening in the later period, which probably implies that we should not 
expect the urban-rural disparities narrowed only by generally leveling the urban-rural 
reimbursement ratios. An inference drawn from the above is that in order to realize the 
EOp between urban and rural residents in health care, merely unifying the 
reimbursement policies is not enough; the widening urban-rural income gap should be 
taken into consideration. For the medical insurance itself, pro-disadvantage policies 
are necessary, according to the maximin principle of Roemer. In order to prove this 
point of view, we then use data from some URIMIS pilot regions in Jiangsu province 
for a further discussion. The results have well verified that pro-disadvantage policies2 
indeed have superiorities in narrowing the urban-rural fairness gap in health care. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 is a simple description of 
the URIMIS; theory of the equality of opportunity and the axiomatic frameworks are 
introduced in section 3, where the illustration of the EOp in health care and our 
decomposition strategy of the fairness gap are also established; section 4 outlines data 
sources and variables; section 5 calculates and explains the urban-rural fairness gaps 
                                                        
2 We give the definition in Section 6. 
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in health care by using the CHNS data, and gets some interesting results; in section 6, 
a further discussion, also a verification of our inference, is conducted by using dataset 
from the URIMIS pilot regions in Jiangsu province; and section 7 concludes. 
2. URIMIS 
The URIMIS tries to overcome the household registration restrictions, and 
unifies the two current separate medical insurance systems, the Medical Insurance for 
Urban Residents (MIUR) and the NCMS3. With raising reimbursement ratios－
especially for rural residents－as one of the necessary steps, the URIMIS aims to 
ensure the same opportunities between urban and rural residents in health care and 
medical security, and to narrow or even eliminate the urban-rural disparities in health 
and health care. A sophisticated URIMIS will help to achieve social fairness in China. 
The URIMIS is still at the exploring stage. Pilot experiments were set out first in 
some advanced regions, and formed various modes adapted to their own local 
characteristics. It was reported that five provincial administrative regions－
municipalities of Tianjin and Chongqing, Qinghai province, Ningxia Hui autonomous 
region, and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps－and 41 prefecture cities, 
as well as 162 counties (districts, county-level cities), had already established the 
URIMIS at the end of 2011. Most of these URIMIS areas had drawn up integration 
strategies to bridge the gap between the NCMS and the MIUR. The advantages of the 
URIMIS have been affirmed by domestic researches, most of which, however, are just 
simple illustrations of the process of local URIMIS policies, due to the short pilot 
time and lack of data resources. These reviews and controversies are obviously 
deficient for the evaluation and comparison of pilot policies, since there has been no 
applicable and unified standard yet. It may fail to understand the real effectiveness 
and efficiency－and then to judge where to go－of different modes of the URIMIS 
when selecting, intentionally or unintentionally, an improper standard. 
3. Theories and methods 
3.1. Equality of opportunity 
During the development of the equality of opportunity, Rawls (1971), who values 
procedural equality more than outcome equality, has made a huge contribution. Rawls 
points out that the public opportunities should be equally open to all individuals 
                                                        
3 In fact, China never gives up the urban-rural coordination and integration during her rapid development, and the 
new century sees her much greater efforts. The URIMIS is just one part of the whole blueprint of urban-rural 
integration. 
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regardless of their races, religions or other factors, which represent the identities. This 
is written as one part of his second principle4 of justice. Another part of the second 
principle is about the fair allocation and overall efficiency, usually called the 
difference principle, under which the most disadvantage group should be granted the 
maximal opportunity. Therefore, the difference principle is also called the Rawls 
maximin principle. Rawls’s idea of the equality of opportunity has been further 
developed during the following decades. Sen (1980, 1999) emphasizes that people 
have the capabilities to choose the way of life they value most. Dworkin (1981a, 
1981b) introduces the concepts of equality of welfare and equality of resources, 
suggesting that some disadvantages, which are out of individual control or without 
individual responsibilities, like circumstances and handicaps, should be compensated. 
Arneson (1989) and Cohen (1989) develop Dworkin’s theory, and bring forward 
separately the concepts of equality of opportunity for welfare and equality of access to 
advantage. Based on these theories, Roemer (1993, 1998, 2002) proposes an 
axiomatic approach, which is becoming a famous framework for empirical studies on 
the equality of opportunity in the social science domain.  
According to Roemer’s framework of the equality of opportunity (EOp), one’s 
advantage (y) is determined by two categories, i.e. circumstances (c) and effort (e); 
the former is beyond one’s control, while the latter is not. The function is as the 
following: 
).,( iii ecyy                                                   (1) 
If we classify circumstances into J types, defining that people in the same kind of 
circumstances belong to the same type, then given one’s effort e , the advantage he 
attains requires to be fixed no matter which type he belongs to. Thus a fair society, as 
Roemer (1998) explains, is a society that will maximize the advantage of those who 
possess the least advantage5, i.e. 
).~,(minmax ecy
c
                                              (2) 
Totaling the advantage of all individuals at each level of effort, we obtain:  
     ,)(),(minmax deefecy
e c                                         (3) 
where f(e) is the density function of the effort. 
Roemer (1998, pp. 5－32) emphasizes that part of the effort can be affected by 
circumstances, which will indirectly affect the distribution characteristics of the 
                                                        
4 The first principle is about the priority of freedom, namely, it should be prior considered, on the premise that all 
people have equal freedom, to maximize the freedom that each one can enjoy. 
5 It is worth noting that Roemer puts forward a somewhat different proposal from that of Rawls, who cares about 
how to maximize the minimum level of advantage, however, across all individuals regardless of their types. 
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advantage, and the society should take responsibility for this kind of interaction. 
Therefore, the advantage attainment should be in line with one’s (relative) degree of 
effort in his own type rather than the (absolute) level of effort. In other words, a fair 
society guarantees people with the same degree of effort obtain the same advantage 
irrespective of their types; or, there is inequality of opportunity, and the society is no 
longer fair. As to the individual, one should take responsibility for, and only for, his 
degree of effort in his type; while he is not responsible for the distribution 
characteristics of the effort. In this way, Roemer defines one’s degree of effort using 
the quantile  in the conditional distribution of his type. Thus (3) can be rewritten as 
(4), which can also be regarded as an explanation of the maximin principle of Roemer: 
.),(minmax 

dcy
c                                            (4) 
3.2. Inequality of opportunity in health and health care 
The introduction of the equality of opportunity into the domain of health 
economics can be traced back to the 1980s. Daniels (1985, 1996) refers to Rawls’ 
equality of opportunity and tries to make use of this theory into the analysis of health 
inequality. However, empirical work just sprang up during the last decade. Zheng 
(2006) introduces the income-health matrix to measure health opportunity and 
inequality caused by unequal health security circumstances and socioeconomic 
structure. Rosa Dias (2009) proposes straight forward the empirical application of 
Roemer’s EOp. Using data from the UK National Child Development Study, he finds 
a significant inequality of opportunity in health, and that circumstances, such as 
parental socioeconomic status (SES) and childhood health, can affect the self-assessed 
health level in adulthood directly and indirectly(e.g. through effort such as education). 
Rosa Dias (2010) further improves and enriches the measurement of inequality of 
opportunity by combining Roemer’s framework with the Grossman model of human 
capital and health demand, and discusses the partial-circumstance problem. Jusot et al. 
(2010) and Trannoy et al. (2010) do similar researches on the inequality of 
opportunity in adulthood health, with childhood condition as the important 
circumstances. Balia and Jones (2011) investigate a special case of health inequality, 
the inequality of opportunity in mortality risk among individuals who and whose 
parents smoke or ever smoked. The last three articles all emphasize both the 
importance of circumstances and the capabilities of change by effort for better 
conditions. Moreover, since health and education are vital types of human capital and 
are interrelated, Jones et al. (2012) analyze primarily the role of education in the 
inequality of opportunity in health, and note that there are significant and 
economically sizable linkages between the quality of education and health in some 
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dimensions.  
As mentioned before, researches on the inequality of opportunity in the health 
and health care domain are rather rare, not to mention relevant topics about China. 
This paper may be one of the first researches that combine the theory of the EOp and 
health care within the urban-rural dualistic background in China. We hope that our 
discussion in this paper will help to the further understanding of the urban-rural health 
care disparities and to the improvement of the URIMIS policy making. 
3.3. Empirical strategy 
3.3.1. Reward principle & compensation principle 
For the EOp analysis, Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009, 2011), within their 
framework of selective egalitarianism, propose two principles－the reward principle 
and the compensation principle. 
Reward principle encourages inequality caused by effort, i.e. differences of 
advantage are allowed if they are brought about by effort. For this reason, when 
measuring the EOp, influences from effort should be wiped off first. The typical 
method is to calculate the “corrected” advantage ỹi of individual i by fixing the value 
of effort ẽ, i.e. ỹi= y(ci, ẽ). In this way, we can obtain the direct unfairness by 
calculating the inequality in ỹ using traditional methods such as Gini index. 
Compensation principle requires that the inequality caused by circumstances 
should be compensated. In other words, for the same effort, each individual should 
attain the same advantage whatever the circumstances he is in; or, compensation 
should be given to those who attain less advantage. Obviously, this principle has a 
close relationship with the horizontal equity, which indicates that the same health care 
need should receive the same health care regardless of one’s income level, region or 
race, etc, all of these factors belonging to circumstances. The typical calculation 
procedure under the compensation principle is first to set an “ideal” distribution of ci 
(c*), and then we obtain the fair distribution of yi (yi
*) via yi
*=y(c*, ei). In this way, the 
unfair inequality of opportunity, i.e. the fairness gap, is (yi - yi
*). 
Though the two principles and their corresponding methods have something in 
common, they are in effect only compatible under one situation that c and e are 
completely independent, i.e. they are additively separable (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 
2009). Therefore we need to choose between the two for empirical work where in 
most cases we cannot ignore the correlation of c and e. 
This paper will base on the compensation principle in view of the following two 
reasons. First, what we care about is how to reimburse rural residents for their 
disadvantage of circumstances. This is much closer to the logic of the compensation 
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principle. Second, reward principle is usually used to explain inequalities within a 
certain group, while compensation principle, between groups. We concern in this 
paper whether the same health care need attains the same health care between urban 
and rural residents. This is more in line with the compensation principle.  
3.3.2. When Roemer meets Oaxaca 
We define c as the indicator of household register (hukou). That is, c is a dummy 
variable indicating whether the individual is an urban resident (c=1) or a rural resident 
(c=0). Then the vector e includes all other factors which, during the analysis, will be 
classified into two components, e1 and e2. The vector e1 is on behalf of factors whose 
correlation with c will bring about illegitimate urban-rural differences, e.g. income 
level and medical insurance types, etc. Contrarily, the vector e2 is on behalf of factors 
which will not bring about illegitimate differences, e.g. health care needs (Fleurbaey 
and Schokkaert, 2011). In this way, the advantage, i.e. the health care use hc in our 
empirical research, can be expressed as a function of c, e1 and e2: 
,)()()( 21 iiiii eechc                               (5)
                      
where β, γ and δ are parameters, α is the constant, and εi is an error item. What’s 
more, in accordance with the definition of e1, it is appropriate to regard e1 as a 
function of c and π (the degree of effort), i.e. 
).,( 11 iii ce 
                                                 
(6) 
Thus (5) can be rewritten as 
.)(),()( 21 iiiiii ecchc   
                        
(7) 
A more general presentation of this function can be written as 
,)()(),()()( 21 iiiiiiii ecccchc   
          
(8) 
where we add μ and ρ to separately express the coefficient differences of 
and χ(ei
2) between urban and rural groups.  
Defining φ(1)=1, φ(0)=0, and taking urban circumstances (U) as the “ideal” 
reference background (c=1), then we obtain the fairness gap between urban and rural 
residents6 as the following: 
).|,(ˆ)]|,()|,([ˆ)|(ˆˆ.. 1112 RURRRURegf iiii     (9) 
The urban-rural inequality of opportunity in health care can be measured 
according to (9), from which we also obtain a decomposition formsimilar to what 
proposed by Oaxaca (1973). At the right hand of this equation, the constant term can 
                                                        
6 According to Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009), the fairness gap should be y(ci,ei)- y(c
*,ei). However, in order to 
obtain positive values of the fairness gap and its components, we use the reverse value here. Since y(c*,ei)and 
y(ci,ei) are the same for urban residents due to the construction of equation, this fairness gap in effect is the 
difference between the counterfactual estimate of the rural residents’ health care expenditure in the urban 
circumstances and the actual health care expenditure of the rural residents. 
),( 1iic  
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 )|(ˆˆ 2 Rei 
).|,(ˆ 1 RU i 
be regarded as a coefficient of variable I, whose value is 1 invariably. Here we 
consider I as one of the elements of e2. In this way, the former two terms 
can be considered as the coefficient effect of e2, namely the e2 coefficient effect. It 
indicates that part of the urban-rural health care gap is from the insufficient health 
care expenditure of rural residents, due to the urban-rural coefficient difference of e2. 
The third term of this equation                          can be regarded as the 
e1 environmental characteristic effect, which indicates that part of the urban-rural 
health care gap is from the difference between the counterfactual characteristics of e1
－the same rural residents with the same degree of effort and the same effort 
distribution characteristics but in the urban circumstances － and its actual 
characteristics when holding the coefficient of e1 as constant as that of rural residents. 
The fourth term                             can be regarded as the e1 environmental 
coefficient effect, which indicates that part of the urban-rural health care gap is from 
the implacable urban-rural coefficient differences of e1, even if rural residents are 
endowed with the same circumstances as urban residents and are then able to 
reproduce a new distribution of e1. 
In our empirical research, we specify the linear form 
iiiiiii ececchc  
21 )()(
                        
(10)
 
for (8), and 
iiiii lcdbcae  
11 )(
                                     
(11) 
for (6), where in (11) a is the constant, b, d and l are parameters, and τi is an error item. 
Others keep the same meanings as before. The estimated results from (10) and (11) 
will then be taken into (12), i.e. 
，)|,(ˆ)]|,()|,([ˆ)|(ˆˆ.. 1112 RUERRERUEReEgf iiii          (12)
 
for the calculation of the fairness gap. 
It is worth noting that the methods of the π obtaining are different between the 
continuous variable and the discrete variable. For continuous variable such as income, 
the π－degree of effort－of individual can be obtained directly from his rank in urban 
or rural groups which he belongs to. However, for discrete variable such as 
self-reported health status, the method is more complicated. We need to know the 
propensity score of each individual in his own group with the help of logistic model, 
and then to obtain his π according to his score. Meanwhile, this paper uses the 
Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulation (Gates, 2007) 7－an approach of full 
                                                        
7 As Gates (2007) explains, the GHK simulation has excellent features, and it is widely used in the health 
economics domain, e.g. Deb and Trivedi (2006), Balia and Jones(2008) and Rosa Dias(2010), etc. STATA has 
already developed the corresponding command cmp, which is detailedly introduced by Roodman (2009).  
)]|,()|,([ˆ 11 RRRU ii   
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information maximum likelihood estimation－for the system estimation, allowing the 
error terms of (10) and (11) to be correlated. 
4. Data 
4.1. Data sources 
The sample is from the CHNS (China Health and Nutrition Survey), which is 
held by the Carolina Population Center of the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety at the Chinese Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention. The CHNS, an ongoing research project, includes 
data waves in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009, covering urban 
and rural regions in nine provinces, which vary substantially in geography, economic 
development, public resources and health indicators. Sub-sample in each of the 
provinces was drawn via a multistage, random cluster process.  
This paper uses data waves from 1997 to 2006, among which data from waves of 
1997 and 2000 constitute the period 1 group, and data from waves of 2004 and 2006 
constitute the group of period 2. We make such data arrangement for the following 
reasons. First, in the analysis we only select respondents who have suffered from 
illnesses during the past four weeks. Relevant questions in waves of 1989, 1991 and 
1993 were not consistent with those of the later waves. Besides, missing values in 
these waves are too common to complete the estimation. Hence we decide not to 
employ data from the 1989, 1991 and 1993 waves. Second, this paper wishes to 
propose, through the empirical analysis, some suggestions with practical values on the 
URIMIS policy making. The wave choosing is one of the keys to the conclusion 
drawing. Given that the URIMIS pilot actions have flourished since 2009, and there is 
no information can help us to distinguish regions which are in the pilot experiments 
from those which are not, we have to drop data in the 2009 wave for safety. Thirdly, 
the numbers of respondents who have suffered from illnesses during the past four 
weeks, in some waves, are not big enough. If we estimate using separately the rest 
four waves, it may discount the validity of our conclusions. Moreover, the NCMS was 
established in 2003, offering a natural and reasonable boundary for pooling the data. 
As a result, the final data only includes respondents who have suffered from illnesses 
during the past four weeks from waves in 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006. And 
respondents from the former two waves are pooled to represent the characteristics of 
the period 1; while respondents from the latter two waves, the period 2. 
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4.2. Variables 
For the measurement of the use of health care, we employ the health care 
expenditure during the past four weeks, as most literatures do. During the selection of 
independent variables and estimation, the key is how to differentiate between 
illegitimate factors and legitimate factors (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2011).  By 
reference of relative studies on racial/ethical disparities of health and health care (e.g. 
Institute of Medicine, 2003; McGuire et al., 2006; Cook et al., 2010; Fleurbaey and 
Schokkaert, 2011), we define that e1－vector of illegitimate factors－ includes 
variables describing medical insurance policy, region and SES, etc., and that e2－
vector of legitimate factors－includes variables describing health care needs and 
individual preferences. Specifically, variables in e1 can be classified into three parts: 
(1) SES variables including family per capita income and education; (2) policy 
variable, i.e. reimbursement ratio; and (3) health care environmental variables, 
including region, medicines availability and travel time for doctor visits. Variables in 
e2 are classified into four parts: (1) demographic variables, including age, sex and 
marital status; (2) general health variables, including self-reported health status and 
chronic disease history; (3) health variables reflecting situations of illness, i.e. types of 
illness one had suffered from and the severity of the illness, during the past four 
weeks; and (4) preference variables, including treatment preferences and lifestyle 
preferences such as whether smoke or drink. 
As is known, the actual reimbursement ratio－the proportion of health care 
expenditure paid for by medical insurance8－may be the best indicator to measure the 
insuring level and the health care economic burden, compared to indicators about 
whether one has participated in any medical insurance or what is the name of the 
participated medical insurance9. However, this is only feasible for respondents whose 
health expenditures are not zero. In the process of data disposing, we have done some 
adjustment to cope with the zero problems. For respondents who did participate in 
medical insurances but spent zero on health care, we take their self-reported policy 
reimbursement ratios10 as replacements. If one’s self-reported policy reimbursement 
ratio is missing, then we replace the missing value with the average ratio of other 
matched respondents who were in the same city, enjoying the same medical insurance 
and at the same health status as him. 
Meanwhile, the treatment preferences are usually ignored in the health care 
                                                        
8 In the CHNS questionnaires there are relevant questions which we can use directly for the measurement. 
9 Usually, there are three basic medical insurances to select, the NCMS, the MIUR, and the UEBMI (Urban 
Employees Basic Medical Insurance). The three constitute the basic medical insurance system in China. 
10 In the CHNS questionnaires the corresponding questions are “What percentage of the fees for outpatient care 
does your insurance pay (not including registration fee)” and “What percentage of the fees for inpatient care does 
your insurance pay (not including food expenses)”. 
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researches, especially in relevant researches in China. In this paper we control the 
treatment preferences to some extent via the question of “what did you do when you 
felt ill”. In addition, prices involved in our study are inflated to the 2009 level 
according to relevant information supplied by CHNS. 
The final sample includes 4168 individuals, 1076 of which is from group of 
period 1, and 3092 is from group of period 2. In period 1, 412 respondents, making 
up 38.3% of the sub-sample, are from urban areas. And in period 2, there are 1283 
urban respondents and 1809 rural respondents, the proportion of urban residents 
increasing to 41.5%. The description of variables is shown in Table 1, where we see 
obvious urban-rural differences in the past-four-week health care expenditure. The 
directly observed differences are 225.096 yuan and 268.149 yuan respectively in 
period 1 and period 2, with the urban residents expending more in both periods. 
Urban-rural differences of SES variables, income and education, as well as policy 
variable, actual reimbursement ratio, are evident, too. Meanwhile, the urban-rural 
differences expressed by medical environmental variables in e1 seem small, which are 
somewhat counter-intuitive. Maybe these available variables are not able to reflect the 
qualities of health care properly or completely, although they do show differences. 
However, they are still reserved for the fairness gap analysis out of consideration for 
comprehensiveness and completion.  
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
5. Results 
How large are the urban-rural inequalities of opportunity in the use of health care? 
We turn to the decomposition strategy in 3.3.2 for analyzing each fairness gap in 
period 1 and period 2. The results are shown in Table 2. 
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
When the urban circumstances are regarded as the “ideal” reference 
circumstances of c, just as Table 2 implies, the total fairness gap is 262.670 yuan in 
period 1. Given that the directly observed urban-rural difference in health care in the 
same period is 225.096 yuan, thus the ratio of the fairness gap to the directly observed 
average urban-rural difference (for short, observed difference) in heath care in period 
1 is 1.167. Intuitively, this ratio indicates that if we observe directly from the original 
data that urban residents on average spend 100 yuan more than rural residents on 
health care, then the truth conforming to the EOp is that urban residents should have 
spent averagely 16.7 yuan less than rural residents, i.e. the fairness gap will reach as 
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much as 116.7 yuan if the result shows a 100-yuan difference between urban and rural 
residents. Similarly, the directly observed urban-rural difference in health care in 
period 2 is 268.149 yuan, but the calculated fairness gap in the same period reaches as 
much as 467.521 yuan; therefore, the ratio in period 2 is as high as 1.744. This 
number indicates that if rural residents are observed directly spending on average 100 
yuan less than urban residents, the fact conforming to the EOp is that rural residents 
should have spent 74.4 yuan more on average. Since the fairness gaps of the two 
periods both exceed 100%, the urban-rural differences we observed straight forward 
from original statistical data have underestimated their essential inequities in both 
periods. Hence we may say that compared to the outcome inequality, the inequality of 
opportunity implies a much worse situation of rural residents in health care. Moreover, 
the value of the fairness gap in period 2 is bigger than that of period 1, showing an 
increase of the inequality of opportunity as the time goes.  
For the three components of the fairness gap, Table 2 shows that the e2 
coefficient effects are always predominant. The ratios of this effect to the observed 
difference are 0.674 in period 1 and 1.173 in period 2, indicating that in the face of 
the same health care needs and the same preferences, the ratios of the urban-rural gap, 
which is caused by coefficient differences between urban and rural residents in health 
care, to the observed difference, reach as much as 0.674 and 1.173 respectively, 
accounting for 57.75% of the whole fairness gap in period 1 and 67.25% in period 2. 
We may think about this effect and its importance from the aspects of health 
consciousness and service qualities. There is ingrained difference between urban and 
rural residents in the consciousness of health and health care use, urban residents 
preferring more to health investment. Meanwhile, there are differences in health 
service qualities between the urban and the rural, urban residents usually receiving 
better medicine and medical techniques.
  
The e1 environmental coefficient effect, according to Table 2, does not play a big 
role, with the ratios of 8.5% and 4.8% in period 1 and period 2, respectively. In 
addition, the ratios of e1 environmental characteristic effect to the observed difference 
are 0.408 and 0.522, respectively, making up 34.96% of the whole fairness gap in 
period 1 and 29.93% in period 2. The absolute contribution of the e1 environmental 
characteristic effect to the fairness gap increases, while its relative contribution does 
in the opposite direction. 
Since the reimbursement ratio is extensively concerned in the medical insurance 
system, here we take a look at it in the fairness gap producing. Table 2 shows an 
interesting change of effect caused by the reimbursement ratio. The reimbursement 
ratio, which plays a big role in period 1 (the ratio is 0.236), shows little importance 
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(the ratio is as little as 0.003) in period 2. One possible interpretation is that, period 1 
is before the establishment of the NCMS, when many rural residents were lack of 
sufficient and efficient medical insurances, and when participating in some medical 
insurances (e.g. the UEBMI), or more straightly speaking, enjoying a certain 
reimbursement in the outpatient or inpatient services, represented some kind of 
privilege, especially for urban residents. This is very important, since the privilege in 
health care usually relates to better health services and higher prices. On the one hand, 
the privilege encourages insureds to seek health care. On the other hand, non-insureds, 
especially poor rural residents, will be reluctant to purchase health care, unless they 
are seriously ill. As the urban residents－especially urban workers and government 
officers－and a few rich rural residents get most of the privilege, the urban-rural 
fairness gap expressed by the reimbursement ratio cannot be overlooked. While 
during the period 2, the NCMS has been already established, and more and more rural 
residents have participated, and enjoyed the reimbursement benefit. The 
reimbursement ratio is not a privilege for a certain group of people any longer, 
although there is still obvious difference on average between urban and rural residents, 
which we can see from Table 1. Therefore the effect of the reimbursement ratio 
becomes so small that we can even ignore it in period 2. 
In view of the index number problem in the Oaxaca decomposition that the 
results from using different indexes may vary large, following the advice of DeMurger 
et al. (2007), we re-conduct the fairness gap decomposition, with rural circumstances 
(R) as the “ideal” reference circumstances, as a robustness test. Our conclusions above 
can still hold true according to the results shown in Appendix B Table B.1. 
6. Further discussion 
6.1. Preliminary inference 
We see in Table 2 an increase of the fairness gap between period 1 and period 2, 
and this increase is faster than that of the urban-rural observed difference. Although 
there is a clear rise of the reimbursement ratio for rural residents, which is shown in 
Table 1, the effect the reimbursement ratio has made to the fairness gap narrowing is 
rather small. So where is the problem?  
As mentioned above, in period 1 when the NCMS had not been established yet, 
many rural residents, especially the rural poor, were lack of sufficient and efficient 
medical insurance and health care services. As a result, the health care consumption in 
the rural was a kind of passive consumption. For most rural residents, going to 
hospital was the last resort. Therefore, income was almost irrelevant to the health care 
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expenditure in this period. While in period 2 when the NCMS had already been 
established, more and more rural residents participated in this medical insurance. The 
health-seeking behaviors and health perceptions changed gradually among rural 
residents, and the health care consumption became more and more positive. This can 
be proved by quantile regressions for rural residents (see Table 3). The results show 
that, the health care expenditure is not significantly dependent on income in period 1, 
except at the 0.9 quantile. While in period 2, this situation has been reversed. 
Therefore, the influence of income on the fairness gap increased (from -0.069 to 
0.548, see Table 2), and income became one important factor for the fairness gap 
change.  
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
Since in recent years, the urban-rural income gap is widening (see Table 1), we 
believe that the big background of the increasing urban-rural income gap should be 
taken into consideration when improving medical insurance policies. Although it’s not 
the main concern of medical insurance system to narrow the urban-rural income gap, 
such gap has already worsened the performance of medical insurance policies. There 
is no gainsaying the fact that relevant government sectors, which are responsible for 
the medical insurance policy making and supervision, have made great effort to 
narrow the urban-rural reimbursement difference. However, since the urban-rural 
income gap is widening, such effort may be counterproductive. Just as described in 
the Example C in Appendix A, the income gap can only counteract the good intentions 
of current medical insurance policies, being a hindrance for the URIMIS aims. 
Therefore, only generally leveling reimbursement ratios between urban and rural 
residents is now obviously insufficient to mitigate the urban-rural inequalities in 
health care, under the background of the income-gap widening. On the basis of 
Roemer’s EOp, pro-disadvantage policies on reimbursement are highly desiderated.  
The above is just our preliminary inference which needs further verification. 
Fortunately, in Jiangsu province, there are indeed some regions where the 
pro-disadvantage policies on medical insurance are implemented. We have made a 
special investigation from the URIMIS pilot regions in Jiangsu province. The data 
will be helpful as a further argument. 
6.2. Jiangsu pilot URIMIS sample 
The Jiangsu pilot URIMIS survey, adopting a multistage, random cluster method, 
had selected 6 regions11 and lasted from December 2011 to April 2012. This survey 
                                                        
11 They are Taicang, Wuxi, Wujin, Yixing, Xinghua and Jingjiang.  
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aimed at estimating the efficiency and differences in efficiency of various URIMIS 
modes in Jiangsu province. During the analysis in this paper, we classify the sample 
into two groups according to whether the regions had implemented pro-disadvantage 
policies in the URIMIS building. For judgment, we consult Gu and Li (2013, pp. 200
－205) and define the pro-disadvantage policies as policies that offer fiscal subsidies 
to those poor rural residents who want to participate in medical insurances with a 
higher security level. For instance, if a rural poor who should have participated in the 
NCMS, wants to and now has the chance to－with the help of premium subsidies－
select the UEBMI or the MIUR, then we will say the local medical insurance policies 
are pro-disadvantage12. 
We select respondents who have got sick during the past one year13. At the mean 
time, respondents with missing values are dropped. The final sample includes 2065 
individuals, among which 608 individuals are in regions where there are 
pro-disadvantage policies (PH group), while the rest 1457 individuals are not (NPH 
group). The PH group has 311 rural respondents and 297 urban respondents, while the 
NPH group has 766 and 691, respectively. Appendix B Table B.2 shows detailed 
information of the data. 
6.3. Fairness-gap decomposition 
Table 4 exhibits the decomposition－the strategy is similar to that in Section 5－
of fairness gaps for both the PH group and the NPH group. An important finding is 
that the fairness gaps of the PH group are far less than those of the NPH group, no 
matter we take U or R as the reference circumstances. The main difference between 
the two groups is located in the e1 environmental characteristic effect. These effects in 
the NPH group are noticeable, while in the PH group are not. The result implies that 
the influence power of the e1 environmental characteristic effect is directly challenged 
in the PH group, since rural residents, who are with higher needs for health care but at 
lower income levels, are able to afford more health care in an advanced medical 
insurance system. Therefore, pro-disadvantage policies do improve the essential EOp 
between urban and rural residents in health care. 
[Please insert Table 4 here] 
Table 5 supports the pro-disadvantage policies from similar quantile regressions 
as Table 3 does. In the NPH group, correlation between income and health care 
                                                        
12 Compared with the other two, the NCMS reimbursement ratio is smaller. Since rural residents at the lowest 
income level usually need more health care but cannot pay the bill, such pro-disadvantage policies will improve 
their affordability and reduce the health risks brought about by passive health care consumption. 
13 The questionnaire of this survey is a little different from relevant parts of the CHNS questionnaire. Therefore 
we change a few variables for the analysis in this section, which we can see from Appendix B Table B.2. 
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expenditure is significant for most quantiles; while such correlation in the PH group is 
not any significant. It is not difficult to understand. Comparing the NPH group with 
Table 3, we see an improvement of the reimbursement policies, since the health care 
use of the rural poorest (at the 0.1 quantile) becomes sensitive to their incomes, which 
shows an active consumption that we have expected to see. However, the NPH 
strategy is not sufficient if the URIMIS wants to reduce the urban-rural inequality of 
opportunity in health care as much as possible. We find better results in the PH group, 
where the fairness gaps are much smaller (see Table 4), and where the health care use 
seems unrelated to one’s income, reflecting to some extent a based-on-need allocation 
of health care. Therefore, the insignificance of the correlation between the health care 
expenditure and income in the PH group does not tell the same thing as in period 1. 
And compared with Table 3, Table 5 also possesses a different explanation for the 
insignificance at the 0.1 quantile.  
[Please insert Table 5 here] 
Due to lack of specific questions about diseases in the pilot URIMIS survey in 
Jiangsu province, there may be some bias in the estimation and calculation, affecting 
the robustness of conclusions. However, we believe that our conclusions here are still 
meaningful. What’s more, since this survey data is of cross section data, the average 
effect of treatment on the treated (ATT) of the PH group cannot be obtained from 
direct comparison with the NPH group. It is proved that under such non-randomized 
trial, the approach of propensity score match (PSM) may maximally mitigate the 
effect caused by the confounding bias and the sample selection bias (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1985; Heckman et al., 1998). Therefore this paper conducts four methods of 
PSM for analyzing the ATT. The results－shown in Table 6－indicate that, the 
pro-disadvantage policies can narrow the fairness gap of urban-rural health care use 
by as much as 27%, when we take U as the “ideal” reference circumstances, and 58%, 
when we take R as the “ideal” reference circumstances. At this moment, we believe 
we have proved our inference described in 6.1 that pro-disadvantage policies will help 
to the realization of the EOp in health care between urban and rural residents. 
[Please insert Table 6 here] 
7. Conclusions 
As one important component of the human capital, health is the basic premise for 
work, and is also vital to the human welfare (Schultz, 1961; Deaton, 2003). 
Meanwhile, the health care inequalities would seriously harm the social welfare just 
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as the income inequalities do. Thus it is of great importance to focus on the issue of 
equity in health care. Mooney (1986) points out that equality should enjoy the priority 
in the trade-offs of efficiency and equality in terms of health. Sen (2002) also 
proposes that the equity of health care is one of the major parts of justice for a country, 
and that the basic health care system should guarantee the civil rights to receive 
health.  
Rural residents have made great contribution to China’s economic development. 
However, what they share from the prosperity is far less than what they should obtain. 
The inequality in health care is just one conspicuous aspect among the urban-rural 
illegitimate gaps. Since the 21st century, China has been improving the rural health 
and health care conditions with great effort, including the expansion of the NCMS, the 
increase of the NCMS reimbursement ratios, and the exploration of the URIMIS. 
During the improvement, it is being heatedly discussed, but without an agreement, on 
how to effectively reduce even eliminate the urban-rural disparities in health care. 
This paper suggests that, focusing on the urban-rural inequality of opportunity is 
much more meaningful than focusing on the urban-rural outcome equality or 
reimbursement equality in health care. And generally leveling the reimbursement 
ratios between urban and rural residents is not sufficient to realize the EOp in health 
care; pro-disadvantage policies are needed.  
This paper analyzes from a broader perspective based on the theory of the EOp. 
We apply the framework of the compensation principle proposed by Fleurbaey and 
Schokkaert (2011) as the base for empirical analysis, and the corresponding fairness 
gap as a measurement of the urban-rural inequality of opportunity in health care. The 
Oaxaca decomposition is established and we define three components of the fairness 
gap, the e2 coefficient effect, the e1 environmental characteristic effect, and the e1 
environmental coefficient effect. We first measure the fairness gaps using data from 
CHNS in 1997－2000 and 2004－2006. The results indicate that a direct observation 
of the urban-rural differences from original statistical data may underestimate the 
essential inequalities. In addition, we have noticed a dramatic change of the effect of 
reimbursement ratio during the two periods. Through further analysis, we infer that 
since the urban-rural income gap is widening, generally leveling reimbursement ratios 
between urban and rural residents becomes insufficient to mitigate the urban-rural 
inequalities in health care. Then a question may arise on how to make use of the 
medical insurance policies in the URIMIS. We give our suggestion which is in line 
with the idea of Roemer(1998). According to Roemer, in an ideal equal world, 
resources should not be distributed on the basis of (absolute) level of effort of 
individuals especially when they are in different types, because circumstances may 
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affect effort. Thus we believe that only generally leveling the reimbursement ratios 
between urban and rural residents is deficient for the health care equality, and the 
urban-rural income gap, which becomes wider and wider in recent years, should also 
be taken into consideration in the URIMIS. Therefore, we suggest that under current 
situation, pro-disadvantage policies should be made to help improve the affordability 
of the rural poor. This suggestion is also in accordance with the Roemer’s maximin 
principle, which calls for the maximization of the advantages of those who possess 
the most disadvantages. Meanwhile, our suggestion is, fortunately, well verified by 
the pilot URIMIS data in Jiangsu province. The results show that the urban-rural 
fairness gap in health care can be narrowed significantly via pro-disadvantage 
policies. 
There inevitably are some limitations in our research. The decomposition 
strategy may need further modification for accuracy. In addition, we use data from 
Jiangsu province as a supplementary support of our proposition. The data may not be 
on behalf of the whole China URIMIS pilot conditions, although it has covered the 
northern, middle and southern parts－the three major economic zones－of Jiangsu 
province, and is able to represent the characteristics of the URIMIS modes in Jiangsu 
and other advanced provinces. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, this paper is a 
preliminary study, using the theory of the EOp of Roemer, on China’s special medical 
insurance policies, in order to provide some useful suggestions on the further 
improvement of the medical insurance systems. We hope that this paper will inspire 
more interest in the conceptualization and measurement of the urban-rural health care 
justice in China. 
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Highlights 
 Roemer’s theory of equality of opportunity (EOp) has drawn more and more 
attention in the health economics domain. While relevant studies on China issues 
are rather rare. This paper just tries to combine the theory of the EOp and the 
urban-rural health care problems in China to help understand the urban-rural 
health care inequalities from a new perspective. 
 It is well known that there are wide disparities in health care between urban and 
rural residents in China. The new program, which we call URIMIS (the 
urban-rural integrated medical insurance system) in this paper, is focusing on 
mitigating such disparities. However, as the program is still in the pilot phase, a 
universally valid strategy remains to be determined. What’s more, there has been, 
to the best of our knowledge, no relevant study on the URIMIS in the 
international academic circle by now. This paper may be the first discussion on 
this issue, and we will give our suggestion based on the EOp for the achievement 
of the URIMIS targets. 
 Our suggestion on the URIMIS policy making keeps in line with the idea of 
Roemer. First, in an ideal equal world, according to Roemer, resources should not 
be distributed on the basis of (absolute) level of effort of individuals especially 
when they are in different types, because circumstances may affect effort. This 
paper believes that only generally leveling the reimbursement ratios between 
urban and rural residents is deficient for the health care equality, and the 
urban-rural income gap, which becomes wider and wider in recent years, should 
also be taken into consideration. Second, Roemer’s maximin principle calls for 
the maximization of the advantage of those who possess the most disadvantage. 
This paper suggests that in the URIMIS, pro-disadvantage policies are needed in 
order to better mitigate, or even eliminate, the health care inequalities between 
urban and rural residents. 
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Table 1 
Description of variables. 
          Period 1                       Period 2           
      Urban          Rural           Urban           Rural     
Variables Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Mean Sd. 
y 
Health care expenditure during the past 4 weeks 779.758 2201.553 554.663 2189.791 709.827 5039.766 441.677 2351.327 
e1 
Family per capita income (yuan/year) 6943.783 7030.383 4569.000 5328.661 10729.150 10548.700 5796.847 8870.297 
Formal education years  7.124 4.730 5.066 4.031 7.836 4.819 5.516 4.181 
Reimbursement ratio (%) 26.036 37.793 6.143 23.223 25.116 34.834 9.360 24.019 
Region (1= the east region, 0= others) 0.383 0.487 0.325 0.469 0.486 0.500 0.411 0.492 
Travel time (min.) by bike to health facility 17.197 20.373 16.089 18.706 14.499 14.464 13.439 17.789 
Medicines availability(1=yes, 0=no) 0.951 0.215 0.967 0.179 0.988 0.111 0.985 0.121 
e2 
  Basic Demographic Information 
Age (years) 53.008 16.252 52.322 15.692 54.145 15.897 55.435 14.686 
Sex (1=male，0=female) 0.422 0.495 0.438 0.497 0.434 0.496 0.423 0.494 
    Marital status (1= married, 0= others) 0.801 0.400 0.797 0.403 0.796 0.403 0.811 0.392 
General Health Information         
Self-reported health status 
(4=excellent, 3=good, 2=fair, 1=poor) 
2.138 0.750 2.056 0.819 2.228 0.797 2.061 0.785 
 Ever diagnosed High blood pressure (1=yes, 0=no) 0.182 0.386 0.148 0.355 0.246 0.431 0.170 0.376 
Diabetes (1=yes, 0=no) 0.158 0.365 0.123 0.329 0.194 0.396 0.132 0.339 
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Myocardial infarction (1=yes, 0=no) 0.015 0.120 0.014 0.116 0.014 0.118 0.009 0.094 
Apoplexy (1=yes, 0=no) 0.039 0.193 0.027 0.163 0.034 0.180 0.025 0.156 
    Illness During the Past 4 Weeks         
Suffered from chronic or acute diseases (1=yes, 0=no) 0.874 0.332 0.883 0.322 0.634 0.482 0.669 0.471 
Got fever, sore throat or cough (1=yes, 0=no) 0.359 0.480 0.357 0.479 0.373 0.484 0.362 0.481 
  Got diarrhea or stomachache (1=yes, 0=no) 0.126 0.332 0.131 0.338 0.156 0.363 0.153 0.360 
  Got headache or dizziness (1=yes, 0=no) 0.306 0.461 0.283 0.451 0.253 0.435 0.265 0.441 
  Got joint pain or muscle pain (1=yes, 0=no) 0.165 0.372 0.181 0.385 0.260 0.439 0.281 0.450 
  Got rash or dermatitis (1=yes, 0=no) 0.032 0.175 0.024 0.153 0.036 0.186 0.024 0.152 
    Got eye/ear disease (1=yes, 0=no) 0.034 0.181 0.026 0.158 0.062 0.240 0.050 0.217 
Got heart disease/chest pain (1=yes, 0=no) 0.102 0.303 0.069 0.254 0.112 0.316 0.082 0.274 
Got other infectious disease (1=yes, 0=no) 0.032 0.175 0.032 0.175 0.047 0.211 0.050 0.217 
Got noncommunicable disease (1=yes, 0=no) 0.158 0.365 0.149 0.356 0.244 0.430 0.187 0.390 
Severity of the illness (3=quite severe, 2=somewhat                
severe, 1=not severe) 
1.740 0.689 1.640 0.674 1.687 0.657 1.702 0.665 
Inpatient visits (1=yes, 0=no) 0.092 0.290 0.074 0.262 0.031 0.174 0.030 0.170 
Preferences         
What to do when felt ill (4=none, 3=saw a doctor, 
2=saw the local health worker, 1=self care) 
2.522 0.908 2.706 0.751 2.074 1.168 2.472 1.048 
Ever smoked (1=yes, 0=no) 0.250 0.434 0.304 0.460 0.313 0.464 0.307 0.462 
Drink alcohol last year (1=yes, 0=no) 0.316 0.465 0.280 0.449 0.341 0.474 0.280 0.449 
Number of sub-sample 412 664 1283 1809 
Source: CHNS data (1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006).  
Note: “Sd.” denotes standard deviation. 
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Table 2 
Decomposition of the fairness gaps using CHNS data. 
      Period 1             Period 2      
Directly observed average differences  225.096 268.149 
 Fairness gap Ratio Fairness gap Ratio 
e2 coefficient effect: 
Age 387.248  1.720  -801.470 -2.989 
Male 76.158  0.338  251.163 0.937 
Married -123.302  -0.548  -105.519 -0.394 
Self-reported health: fair 166.831  0.741  -593.614 -2.214 
Self-reported health: good 56.920  0.253  -305.803 -1.140 
Self-reported health: excellent 18.001  0.080  -29.494 -0.110 
High blood pressure 54.396  0.242  0.897 0.003 
Diabetes -79.090  -0.351  51.664 0.193 
Myocardial infarction 6.067  0.027  -4.507 -0.017 
Apoplexy 7.781  0.035  -3.898 -0.015 
Suffered from chronic or acute diseases 667.391  2.965  -165.665 -0.618 
Got fever, sore throat or cough -136.195  -0.605  90.036 0.336 
Got diarrhea or stomachache -28.023  -0.124  -44.276 -0.165 
Got headache or dizziness 78.907  0.351  -48.257 -0.180 
Got joint pain or muscle pain -1.126  -0.005  41.766 0.156 
Got rash or dermatitis 4.013  0.018  40.411 0.151 
Got eye/ear disease -42.756  -0.190  24.671 0.092 
Got heart disease/chest pain  34.711  0.154  63.017 0.235 
Got other infectious disease 39.230  0.174  17.924 0.067 
Got noncommunicable disease -64.060  -0.285  46.340 0.173 
Severity of the illness: somewhat severe 111.614  0.496  -4.149 -0.015 
Severity of the illness: quite severe 82.171  0.365  133.673 0.499 
Inpatient -8.388  -0.037  43.000 0.160 
To see local health worker when felt ill 0.692  0.003  -20.647 -0.077 
To see a doctor when felt ill 163.488  0.726  189.518 0.707 
To do nothing when felt ill 31.194  0.139  55.693 0.208 
Smoke -3.613  -0.016  -54.234 -0.202 
Drink -165.846  -0.737  -103.918 -0.388 
Wave -27.906  -0.124  -99.114 -0.370 
Intercept -1154.844  -5.130  1649.307 6.151 
Sub-total 151.663  0.674  314.513 1.173 
e1 environmental characteristic effect:  
Family per capita income -15.542  -0.069  147.014 0.548 
Education 70.475  0.313  13.324 0.050 
Reimbursement ratio 53.126  0.236  0.793 0.003 
East China -8.402  -0.037  -20.763 -0.077 
Travel time to health facility -9.245  -0.041  -0.729 -0.003 
Medicines available 1.352  0.006  0.373 0.001 
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Sub-total 91.763  0.408  140.011 0.522 
e1 environmental coefficient effect:  
Family per capita income -28.221  -0.125  87.714 0.327 
Education 129.135  0.574  16.578 0.062 
Reimbursement ratio 16.633  0.074  10.050 0.037 
East China -34.839  -0.155  -64.626 -0.241 
Travel time to health facility -68.028  -0.302  21.779 0.081 
Medicines available 4.564  0.020  -58.499 -0.218 
Sub-total 19.244  0.085  12.997 0.048 
Total 262.670  1.167  467.521 1.744 
Number of sub-sample            1076       3092 
Note: “Ratio” in the 3rd and 5th column denotes the ratio of the decomposed fairness gap as well as the total 
fairness gap, i.e. each cell in the 2nd and 4th column, to the directly observed average difference in the 
corresponding period. 
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Table 3 
Quantile regressions of health care expenditure on income using CHNS data (rural residents). 
Quantile 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Number of 
sub-sample 
Period 1 
0.025 
(0.036) 
0.024 
(0.022) 
0.026 
(0.021) 
0.025 
(0.020) 
0.036* 
(0.021) 
664 
Period 2 
0.015 
(0.025) 
0.040*** 
(0.014) 
0.032*** 
(0.010) 
0.018* 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
1809 
Note: all variables are listed in Table 1; the dependent variable is the log of family per capita income; the 
independent variable is the log of health care expenditure; other control variables are not shown here; ***, **, * 
represents significance at the level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.  
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Table 4 
Decomposition of the fairness gap using Jiangsu data. 
 
   U as the reference c    
Robustness test:  
   R as the reference c    
 Fairness gap Ratio Fairness gap Ratio 
NPH group 
Directly observed average difference 496.780 
e2 coefficient effect 208.544 0.420 287.731 0.579 
environmental e1 characteristic effect 201.116 0.405 224.092 0.451 
environmental e1 coefficient effect -182.754 -0.368 62.296 0.125 
Total 226.907 0.457 574.118 1.156 
Number of sub-sample 1457 
PH group 
Directly observed average difference 130.001 
e2 coefficient effect 66.259 0.510 61.196 0.471 
environmental e1 characteristic effect -17.271 -0.133 14.339 0.110 
environmental e1 coefficient effect -24.159 -0.186 -0.803 -0.006 
Total 24.829 0.191 74.732 0.575 
Number of sub-sample 608 
Note: “Ratio” in the 3rd and 5th column denotes the ratio of the decomposed fairness gap as well as the total 
fairness gap, i.e. each cell in the 2nd and 4th column, to the directly observed average difference in the 
corresponding group. 
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Table 5 
Quantile regressions of health care expenditure on income using Jiangsu data (rural residents). 
Quantile 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Number of 
sub-sample 
NPH group 
0.055*** 
(0.013) 
0.025*** 
(0.009) 
0.013*** 
(0.030) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.0003 
(0.009) 
766 
PH group 
-0.016 
(0.021) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.0001 
(0.002) 
311 
Note: all variables are listed in Appendix B Table B.2; the dependent variable is the log of family per capita 
income; the independent variable is the log of health care expenditure; other control variables are not shown here; 
***, **, * represents significance at the level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.  
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Table 6 
Fairness gaps under four PSM methods. 
        U as the reference circumstances          Robustness test: R as the reference circumstances   
  T size C size 
ATT (% of 
fairness gap) 
Standard 
deviation 
T size C size 
ATT (% of 
fairness gap) 
Standard 
deviation 
Nearest neighbor 
matching method 
e2 coefficient effect 311 157 0.040 0.062 297 199 -0.157*** 0.045 
e1 environmental characteristic effect 311 157 -0.475*** 0.056 297 199 -0.350*** 0.031 
e1 environmental coefficient effect 311 157 0.162*** 0.023 297 199 -0.127*** 0.013 
Total 311 157 -0.272*** 0.082 297 199 -0.634*** 0.056 
Radius matching 
method 
e2 coefficient effect 311 728 0.090** 0.043 297 679 -0.107*** 0.032 
e1 environmental characteristic effect 311 728 -0.534*** 0.028 297 679 -0.340*** 0.019 
e1 environmental coefficient effect 311 728 0.180*** 0.022 297 679 -0.132*** 0.011 
Total 311 728 -0.263*** 0.057 297 679 -0.579*** 0.039 
Layered matching 
method 
e2 coefficient effect 311 728 0.088* 0.056 297 679 -0.117*** 0.036 
e1 environmental characteristic effect 311 728 -0.531*** 0.050 297 679 -0.337*** 0.022 
e1 environmental coefficient effect 311 728 0.176*** 0.023 297 679 -0.133*** 0.011 
Total 311 728 -0.267*** 0.060 297 679 -0.587*** 0.046 
Kernel matching 
method 
e2 coefficient effect 311 728 0.085 0.057 297 679 -0.112*** 0.036 
e1 environmental characteristic effect 311 728 -0.530*** 0.044 297 679 -0.339*** 0.022 
e1 environmental coefficient effect 311 728 0.173*** 0.023 297 679 -0.132*** 0.012 
Total 311 728 -0.272*** 0.068 297 679 -0.583*** 0.043 
Note: “T size” denotes the sample size of treatment groups; “C size” denotes the sample size of control groups which include those living in where there are no pro-disadvantage policies; ***, ** 
and * represents the significance level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.
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Appendix A 
Examples of the Misleading Aspects of the Outcome Equality and 
Reimbursement Equality in the Health Care Analysis 
 
In the introduction of this paper, we endorse the idea that we should focus on the 
essential equity, i.e. the equality of opportunity (EOp), rather than the outcome 
equality or the reimbursement equality of health care. Here we give three examples as 
a simple explanation. Example A and B explain the misleading use of the outcome 
equality, and Example C, the reimbursement equality. 
 
Example A: Suppose the aging proportion is higher among urban residents, who involuntarily 
have more health need, and thus more health care expenditure, than rural residents. Such 
urban-rural differences due to demographic characteristics are indeed reasonable and desirable, 
reflecting the effective allocation of health resources. Under such situation, policies need no 
interfere, while purchasing the outcome equality may result in inefficiency. 
Example B: Suppose there are two residents belonging respectively to the urban and rural 
areas. The health care expenditure of the rural resident should have been 1000 yuan because of his 
serious illness. However, as lack of money or effective medical security, his actual expenditure is 
only 500 yuan. Meanwhile, the urban resident, who enjoys a more generous medical insurance, 
spends the same 500 yuan for a health problem, such as flu, which could have been cured with the 
expense of only 100 yuan. There seems no inequality from straightforward the aspect of actual 
expenditure on health care. However, the essential inequality was concealed. 
Example C: Suppose there are two residents belonging respectively to the urban and rural 
areas and enjoying the same reimbursement of 50%. One day, they both are attacked by a same 
disease, such as flu. However, the rural resident decides not to see a doctor because of lack of 
money, but the urban resident does. Then, the premium paid by the rural resident in effect is used 
to reimburse the urban resident, resulting in the phenomenon of the rural help the urban or the 
poor help the rich, although we are reluctant to face it. Thus when we judge based on the 
reimbursement equality, such as whether there are unified reimbursement policies for both urban 
and rural residents, there may also be essential inequalities. 
 
    Therefore, if we judge the urban-rural equality or inequality from the viewpoint 
of the outcome equality or the reimbursement equality, we may miss the essential 
inequality. Policies based on these theories may lead to inefficiency, even inequity. A 
broad view is needed in analyzing inequalities of the urban-rural health care use, and 
the theory of equality of opportunity (EOp) can avoid such mistakes or disadvantages 
we illustrate in the above examples. 
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Appendix B 
Table B.1 
Robustness test of Table 2: rural as the reference circumstances. 
        Period 1               Period 2       
Directly observed average differences  225.096 268.149 
 Fairness gap Ratio Fairness gap Ratio 
e2 coefficient effect:
 
 
Age 392.324 1.743 -782.817 -2.919 
Male 73.391 0.326 257.510 0.960 
Married -123.965 -0.551 -103.547 -0.386 
Self-reported health: fair 192.867 0.857 -556.721 -2.076 
Self-reported health: good 61.505 0.273 -410.789 -1.532 
Self-reported health: excellent 13.187 0.059 -39.637 -0.148 
High blood pressure 67.092 0.298 1.297 0.005 
Diabetes -101.040 -0.449 75.892 0.283 
Myocardial infarction 6.518 0.029 -7.149 -0.027 
Apoplexy 11.146 0.050 -5.252 -0.020 
Suffered from chronic or acute diseases 660.779 2.936 -156.815 -0.585 
Got fever, sore throat or cough -137.071 -0.609 92.643 0.345 
Got diarrhea or stomachache -26.994 -0.120 -45.075 -0.168 
Got headache or dizziness 85.231 0.379 -46.166 -0.172 
Got joint pain or muscle pain -1.028 -0.005 38.642 0.144 
Got rash or dermatitis 5.254 0.023 60.954 0.227 
Got eye/ear disease -56.747 -0.252 30.534 0.114 
Got heart disease/chest pain  51.078 0.227 86.451 0.322 
Got other infectious disease 39.139 0.174 16.848 0.063 
Got noncommunicable disease -67.785 -0.301 60.327 0.225 
Severity of the illness: somewhat severe 122.736 0.545 -4.157 -0.016 
Severity of the illness: quite severe 103.797 0.461 124.753 0.465 
Inpatient -10.483 -0.047 44.911 0.167 
To see local health worker when felt ill 0.367 0.002 -8.647 -0.032 
To see a doctor when felt ill 151.617 0.674 124.701 0.465 
To do nothing when felt ill 26.976 0.120 53.760 0.200 
Smoke -2.969 -0.013 -55.150 -0.206 
Drink -186.812 -0.830 -126.831 -0.473 
Wave -24.483 -0.109 -97.180 -0.362 
Intercept -1154.844 -5.130 1649.307 6.151 
Sub-total 170.783 0.759 272.597 1.017 
e1 environmental characteristic effect:  
Family per capita income -0.874 -0.004 72.381 0.270 
Education 18.030 0.080 6.352 0.024 
Reimbursement ratio 16.448 0.073 -16.123 -0.060 
East China -2.170 -0.010 -9.087 -0.034 
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Travel time to health facility -4.561 -0.020 -2.447 -0.009 
Medicines available 2.793 0.012 0.519 0.002 
Sub-total 29.667 0.132 51.594 0.192 
e1 environmental coefficient effect:  
Family per capita income -42.889 -0.191 162.347 0.605 
Education 181.580 0.807 23.550 0.088 
Reimbursement ratio 53.310 0.237 26.966 0.101 
East China -41.072 -0.182 -76.301 -0.285 
Travel time to health facility 2.187 0.010 -58.644 -0.219 
Medicines available -72.712 -0.323 23.497 0.088 
Sub-total 80.404 0.357 101.414 0.378 
Total 280.854 1.248 425.605 1.587 
Number of sub-sample 1076 3092 
Note: “Ratio” in the 3rd and 5th column denotes the ratio of the decomposed fairness gap as well as the total 
fairness gap, i.e. each cell in the 2nd and 4th column, to the directly observed average difference in the 
corresponding period. 
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Table B.2 
Description of variables of the Jiangsu survey data. 
         NPH Group                  PH Group           
        Rural              Urban               Rural              Urban        
Names of variables Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd 
y   Health care expenditure in the past year 1798.922 6824.057 2295.702 7926.267 2541.514 7840.156 2671.515 8891.821 
e1  Family per capita income (yuan/year) 15155.300 9106.527 19132.640 10200.820 13206.500 6069.876 18156.630 9523.793 
Formal education years 6.759 4.008 9.065 4.497 5.797 3.998 8.862 4.663 
Reimbursement ratio (%) 0.201 0.325 0.317 0.410 0.333 0.313 0.415 0.381 
Walking time to the neatest health facility (h.) 0.301 0.481 0.296 0.427 0.329 0.675 0.213 0.149 
Insurance type(1=UEBMI,2=MIUR,3=NCMS) 2.086 0.837 1.508 0.500 1.540 0.499 1.498 0.501 
e2   age 44.556 18.973 42.253 19.540 54.235 19.363 44.949 19.733 
Sex(1=female，0=male) 0.486 0.500 0.456 0.498 0.534 0.500 0.448 0.498 
Marital status (1= married, 0= others) 1.008 0.592 0.978 0.686 0.865 0.342 0.714 0.453 
    Household size 3.414 1.192 3.449 1.042 3.386 1.257 3.694 1.141 
Self-reported health status(1=excellent, 2=good, 
 3=fair, 4=poor, 5=very poor) 
3.354 1.217 3.467 1.183 2.916 1.172 3.155 1.195 
Whether have chronic diseases (1=yes, 0=no) 0.230 0.421 0.287 0.452 0.286 0.453 0.239 0.427 
Whether been in hospital last year (1=yes, 0=no) 0.110 0.313 0.107 0.309 0.125 0.332 0.135 0.342 
Severity of the illness (3=quite severe, 
 2=somewhat  severe, 1=not severe) 
1.892 0.607 1.795 0.662 1.807 0.668 1.758 0.627 
Temporal disability days 12.764 55.217 13.187 55.755 6.794 32.453 9.239 44.022 
What to do when felt ill (1= self care, 2=saw the 
 local health worker, 3=saw a doctor, 1= none) 
2.433 0.988 2.363 1.035 2.055 0.977 2.111 1.019 
Number of sub-sample 766 691 311 297 
Source: Authors’ survey. 
Note: “Sd.” denotes the Standard deviation. 
